We present a novel approach to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that dramatically improves performance and bases security on weaker assumptions. A central conceptual contribution in our work is a new way of constructing leveled, fully homomorphic encryption schemes (capable of evaluating arbitrary polynomial-size circuits of a-priori bounded depth), without Gentry's bootstrapping procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gentry 2009b; Rivest et al. 1978 ] allows a computationally powerful worker to receive encrypted data and perform arbitrarily complex, dynamically chosen computations on that data while it remains encrypted, despite not having the secret decryption key. Until recently, all FHE schemes [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011a; Coron et al. 2011; Gentry 2009b; Gentry and Halevi 2011b; Smart and Vercauteren 2010; van Dijk et al. 2010] followed the same blueprint, namely, the one laid out in Gentry's original construction [Gentry 2009a [Gentry , 2009b .
The first step in Gentry's blueprint is to construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme, namely, an encryption scheme capable of evaluating low-degree multivariate polynomials homomorphically. Starting with Gentry's original construction based on ideal lattices [Gentry 2009b] , there are by now a number of such schemes in the literature [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011a; Coron et al. 2011; Gentry and Halevi 2011b; Lauter et al. 2011; Smart and Vercauteren 2010; van Dijk et al. 2010 ], all of which are based on lattices (either directly or implicitly). The ciphertexts in all these schemes are "noisy", where the noise grows slightly during homomorphic addition and explosively during homomorphic multiplication and, hence, the limitation of low-degree polynomials.
To obtain FHE, Gentry provided a remarkable bootstrapping theorem which states that given an SWHE scheme that can evaluate its own decryption function (plus an additional operation), one can transform it into a "leveled" FHE scheme. Bootstrapping "refreshes" a ciphertext by running the decryption function on it homomorphically using an encrypted secret key (given in the public key), resulting in a reduced noise. A leveled FHE scheme is a slightly weaker, but still practically as useful, variant of FHE, where the parameters of the scheme may depend on the depth of the circuits that the scheme can evaluate (but not on their size). The schemes we construct in this work are all leveled FHE schemes. One can obtain a "pure" FHE scheme (with a constant-size public key) from these leveled FHE schemes by assuming circular security, namely, that it is "safe" to encrypt the leveled FHE secret key under its own public key. With this understanding, and when there is no cause for confusion, we will omit the term "leveled" throughout this work.
Thus, to finish the construction, it is sufficient to design an SWHE scheme that is capable of homomorphically evaluating its own decryption circuit (plus some). Unfortunately, until very recently, natural SWHE schemes were incapable of evaluating their own decryption circuits without making significant modifications to the scheme, resulting in additional cryptographic assumptions. (We discuss two recent and important exceptions [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011a; Gentry and Halevi 2011b] next). Thus, the final step in Gentry's blueprint is to squash the decryption circuit of the SWHE scheme, namely, transform the scheme into one with the same homomorphic capacity but with a decryption circuit that is simple enough to allow bootstrapping. Gentry [2009b] showed how to do this by adding a "hint", namely, a large set of numbers with a secret sparse subset that sums to the original secret key, to the public key. Of course, the hint can be seen as useful information about the secret key, and the security of the scheme in the presence of the hint relies on a new "sparse subset sum" assumption (which, roughly speaking, can be thought of as saying that the hint is useless to a computationally-bounded adversary).
properties just discussed. Thus, their per-gate computation is still more than˜ (λ 4 ). Nevertheless, the techniques introduced in these recent constructions are very interesting and useful to us. In particular, we use the tools and techniques introduced by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] in an essential way to achieve remarkable efficiency gains.
An important, somewhat orthogonal question is the strength of assumptions underlying FHE schemes. All the schemes so far rely on the hardness of short vector problems on lattices with a subexponential approximation factor. Can we base FHE on the hardness of finding a polynomial approximation?
Our Results and Techniques
We leverage Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's techniques [2011b] to achieve asymptotically very efficient FHE schemes. Also, we base security on lattice problems with quasipolynomial approximation factors. (All previous schemes relied on the hardness of problems with subexponential approximation factors.) In particular, we present the following two results.
-Assuming Ring LWE for an approximation factor exponential in L, we have a leveled FHE scheme that can evaluate L-level arithmetic circuits without using bootstrapping. The scheme hasÕ(λ · L 3 ) per-gate computation (namely, quasilinear in the security parameter). -Alternatively, assuming Ring LWE is hard for quasipolynomial factors, we have a leveled FHE scheme that uses bootstrapping as an optimization, where the per-gate computation (which includes the bootstrapping procedure) isÕ(λ 2 ), independent of L.
We can alternatively base security on LWE, albeit with worse performance. We now sketch our main idea for boosting efficiency.
In the scheme of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] , like ours, a ciphertext vector c ∈ R n (where R is a ring, and n is the dimension of the vector) that encrypts a message m satisfies the decryption formula m = [ c, s ] q 2 , where s ∈ R n is the secret key vector, q is an odd modulus, and [ ·] q : R →[ −q/2, q/2) denotes the modular reduction function that reduces a real number x into the range (−q/2, q/2). This is an abstract scheme that can be instantiated with either LWE or Ring LWE. In the LWE instantiation, R is the ring of integers mod q and n is a large dimension, whereas in the Ring LWE instantiation, R is the ring of polynomials over integers mod q and an irreducible f (x), and the dimension n = 2.
We will call c, s the noise associated to ciphertext c under key s. Decryption succeeds as long as the magnitude of the noise stays smaller than q/2. Homomorphic addition and multiplication increase the noise in the ciphertext. The addition of two ciphertexts with noise at most B results in a ciphertext with noise at most 2B, whereas multiplication results in a noise as large as B 2 . 3 We will describe a noise-management technique that keeps the noise in check by reducing it after homomorphic operations, without bootstrapping.
The key technical tool we use for noise management is the modulus-switching technique developed by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] . Jumping ahead, we note that while they use modulus switching in one shot to obtain a small ciphertext (to which they then apply Gentry's bootstrapping procedure), we will use it (iteratively, gradually) to keep the noise level essentially constant, while stingily sacrificing modulus size and gradually sacrificing the remaining homomorphic capacity of the scheme.
Modulus Switching
The essence of the modulus-switching technique is captured in the following lemma. In other words, the lemma says that an evaluator, who does not know the secret key s but instead only knows a bound on its length, can transform a ciphertext c modulo q into a different ciphertext modulo p, while preserving correctness, namely, [ c , s ] p = [ c, s ] q mod2. The transformation from c to c involves simply scaling by (p/q) and rounding appropriately. Most interestingly, if s is short and p is sufficiently smaller than q, the noise in the ciphertext actually decreases, namely,
This lemma is such an important centerpiece of our work that we will state and prove it right here. (1)
where 1 (s) is the 1 -norm of s. Amazingly, this trick permits the evaluator to reduce the magnitude of the noise without knowing the secret key, and without bootstrapping. In other words, modulus switching gives us a very powerful and lightweight way to manage the noise in FHE schemes. In Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] , the modulus-switching technique is bundled into a "dimension reduction" procedure, and we believe it deserves a separate name and close scrutiny. It is also worth noting that our use of modulus switching does not require an "evaluation key", in contrast to Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] .
PROOF. For some integer k, we have [ c, s ]

Our New Noise Management Technique
At first, it may look like modulus switching is not a very effective noise management tool. If p is smaller than q, then of course modulus switching may reduce the magnitude of the noise, but it reduces the modulus size by essentially the same amount. In short, the ratio of the noise to the noise ceiling (the modulus size) does not decrease at all. Isn't this ratio what dictates the remaining homomorphic capacity of the scheme, and how could potentially worsening (certainly not improving) this ratio do anything useful?
In fact, it's not just the ratio of the noise to the noise ceiling that's important. The absolute magnitude of the noise is also important, especially in multiplications. Suppose that q ≈ x k , and that you have two mod-q SWHE ciphertexts with noise of magnitude x. If you multiply them, the noise becomes x 2 . After four levels of multiplication, the noise is x 16 . If you do another multiplication at this point, you reduce the ratio of the noise ceiling (i.e., q) to the noise level by a huge factor of x 16 , that is, you reduce this gap very fast. Thus, the actual magnitude of the noise impacts how fast this gap is reduced. After only log k levels of multiplication, the noise level reaches the ceiling. Now, consider the following alternative approach. Choose a ladder of gradually decreasing moduli {q i ≈ q/x i } for i < k. After you multiply the two mod-q ciphertexts, switch the ciphertext to the smaller modulus q 1 = q/x. As the preceding lemma shows, the noise level of the new ciphertext (now with respect to the modulus q 1 ) goes from x 2 back down to x. (Let's suppose for now that 1 (s) is small in comparison to x so that we can ignore it.) Now, when we multiply two ciphertexts (w.r.t. modulus q 1 ) that have noise level x, the noise again becomes x 2 , but then we switch to modulus q 2 to reduce the noise back to x. In short, each level of multiplication only reduces the ratio (noise ceiling)/(noise level) by a factor of x (not something like x 16 ). With this new approach, we can perform about k (not just log k) levels of multiplication before we reach the noise ceiling. We have just increased (without bootstrapping) the number of multiplicative levels that we can evaluate by an exponential factor. This exponential improvement is enough to achieve leveled FHE without bootstrapping. For any polynomial L, we can evaluate circuits of depth L. The performance of the scheme degrades with L (e.g., we need to set q = q 0 to have bit length proportional to L), but it degrades only polynomially with L.
Our main observation-the key to obtaining FHE without bootstrapping-is so simple that it is easy to miss and bears repeating: We get noise reduction automatically via modulus switching, and by carefully calibrating our ladder of moduli {q i }-one modulus for each circuit level-to be decreasing gradually, we can keep the noise level very small and essentially constant from one level to the next, while only gradually sacrificing the size of our modulus until the ladder is used up. With this approach, we can efficiently evaluate arbitrary polynomial-size arithmetic circuits without resorting to bootstrapping.
In terms of performance, this scheme trounces previous FHE schemes in terms of both asymptotic and concrete performance. Instantiated with ring-LWE, it can evaluate L-level arithmetic circuits with per-gate computationÕ(λ·L 3 ), that is, computation quasilinear in the security parameter. Since the ratio of the largest modulus (namely, q ≈ x L ) to the noise (namely, x) is exponential in L, the scheme relies on the hardness of approximating short vectors to within an exponential in L factor.
Bootstrapping for Better Efficiency and Better Assumptions
In our FHE-without-bootstrapping scheme, the per-gate computation depends polynomially on the number of levels in the circuit that is being evaluated. While this approach is efficient (in the sense of polynomial time) for polynomial-size circuits, the per-gate computation may become undesirably high for very deep circuits, so we reintroduce bootstrapping as an optimization that makes the per-gate computation independent of the circuit depth, and that (if one is willing to assume circular security) allows homomorphic operations to be performed indefinitely without needing to specify in advance a bound on the number of circuit levels. The main idea is that to compute arbitrary polynomial-depth circuits, it is enough to compute the decryption circuit of the scheme homomorphically. Since the decryption circuit has depth ≈ log λ, the largest modulus we need has only polylog(λ) bits, and therefore we can base security on the hardness of lattice problems with quasipolynomial factors. Since the decryption circuit has size O(λ) for the RLWE-based instantiation, the per-gate computation becomes O(λ 2 ) (independent of L). See Section 6 for details.
We then consider batching as an optimization. The idea behind batching is to pack multiple plaintexts into each ciphertext so that a function can be homomorphically evaluated on multiple inputs with approximately the same efficiency as homomorphically evaluating it on one input.
An especially interesting case is batching the decryption function so that multiple ciphertexts (e.g., all of the ciphertexts associated to gates at some level in the circuit) can be bootstrapped simultaneously very efficiently. For circuits of large width (say, width λ), batched bootstrapping reduces the per-gate computation in the RLWE-based instantiation toÕ(λ), independent of L. We give the details in Section 6.
Related and Subsequent Work
Prior to Gentry's construction, there were already a few interesting homomorphic encryption schemes that could be called "somewhat homomorphic", including that of Boneh et al. [2005] (that evaluates quadratic formulas using bilinear maps), Melchor et al. [2010] (that evaluates constant degree polynomials using lattices), and Ishai and Paskin [2007] (that evaluates branching programs).
Our work has inspired a number of follow-up works, building upon it and extending it in both theoretical and practical directions.
Our RLWE-based FHE scheme without bootstrapping requires onlyÕ(λ · L 3 ) per-gate computation, where L is the depth of the circuit being evaluated, while the bootstrapped version has onlyÕ(λ 2 ) per-gate computation. For circuits of width (λ), we can use batching to reduce the per-gate computation of the bootstrapped version by another factor of λ. In a follow-up work, Gentry et al. [2012b] showed how to reduce the per-gate evaluation overhead to polylogarithmic, making clever use of sorting networks to avoid packing/unpacking after every batched operation. They further suggested [Gentry et al. 2012a ] choices of parameters so as to optimize the implementation of RLWE-based schemes. However, the polylogarithmic factors in these constructions are still too large to offer improvement for any "reasonable" value of the security parameter. One future direction toward a truly practical scheme is to tighten up these polylogarithmic factors considerably.
Using the ideas from this work in an essential way, Gentry et al. [2012c] implemented a variant of our scheme and presented benchmarks for homomorphic evaluation of the AES function. Brakerski [2012] showed how to achieve comparable performance to ours without using modulus switching for arbitrary values of "initial" q. This is achieved by scaling the ciphertexts at the beginning of time rather than doing so after every operation. Gentry et al. [2012a] showed how to perform ideal reduction in the general case (and not just for the rings that we consider), significantly extending our ideas from Section 3.
More recently, Halevi and Shoup [2013] implemented our scheme together with the optimizations proposed by Gentry et al. in an open-source homomorphic encryption library called HElib.
PRELIMINARIES
Basic Notation
In our construction, we will use a ring R, whose elements we write in the lower case (e.g., r ∈ R). The reader should think of concrete instantiations of the ring to be either the ring of rational integers Z or the polynomial ring Z[ x] /(x d + 1) for d a power of 2. When R is the ring of rational integers Z, the notation r refers to the absolute magnitude of r. When R is the polynomial ring Z[ x] /(x d + 1), r ∈ R is a polynomial of degree at most d−1, and the notation r refers to the Euclidean norm of the coefficient vector of r. We also refer to r as the length of r.
We write vectors in boldface (e.g., v ∈ R n ). The notation v [ i] refers to the ith coefficient of v. We write the scalar product of u, v ∈ R n as u,
to be the expansion factor of R. It is easy to see that for R = Z, γ R = 1 and for
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. We provide a proof for completeness.
PROOF. Let a, b ∈ R. Then, each coefficient of a · b is a scalar product of coefficients of a and b (or their rotations), modulo the sign. Thus, each coefficient has magnitude at most a · b by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. So,
Although working with the canonical embedding of Z[ x] /(x d + 1) provides a tighter way of handling the geometry of cyclotomic rings [Lyubashevsky et al. 2010] and eliminates the need to work with the expansion factor, we prefer to work with the coefficient representation of r ∈ Z[ x] /(x d + 1) in this exposition, as it is simple to describe and suffices for our asymptotic results.
For an integer q, we use R q to denote R/qR. For a ∈ R, we use the notation [ a] q to refer to a mod q, with coefficients reduced into the range (−q/2, q/2].
Sometimes we will abuse notation and use R 2 to denote the set of R-elements with binary coefficients. For example, when R = Z, R 2 may denote {0, 1}, and when R is a polynomial ring, R 2 may denote those polynomials whose coefficients are either 0 or 1. We use R q,d when we also want to specify the degree of the polynomial associated to R. When it is obvious that q is not a power of two, we will use log q to denote 1 + log q .
Finally, we define what it means for a distribution (ensemble) to be bounded. 
Homomorphic Encryption
Our definitions here largely follow the exposition of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] . We do take the liberty to slightly modify the algorithmic interface to better fit our constructions, and we urge even the knowledgeable reader to go over them so as to avoid confusion in interpreting our results.
We start with a generic definition of homomorphic encryption that captures both partially and fully homomorphic schemes. A homomorphic (public-key) encryption scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (HE.Setup, HE.SecretKeyGen, HE.PublicKeyGen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval) (although, in our exposition, we will start by describing a regular, non-homomorphic, public-key encryption scheme which has the same syntax as the preceding except for the homomorphic evaluation algorithm.)
In this work, the message space M of the encryption schemes will always be some ring R M , and the functions to be evaluated will be represented as arithmetic circuits over this ring, composed of addition and multiplication gates.
The syntax of these algorithms is as follows.
-Setup. The algorithm params ← HE.Setup(1 λ ) takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs the global parameters of the encryption scheme. Jumping ahead, we remark that in our LWE-, and RLWE-based constructions, this will include a number of parameters, such as a dimension n, a modulus q, an error distribution χ , and so on. -Key Generation. Key generation consists of a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. The secret key generation algorithm sk ← HE.SecretKeyGen(params) takes the global parameters and outputs a secret decryption key sk. The public key generation algorithm pk ← HE.PublicKeyGen(params, sk) takes as input the global parameters and the secret key, and outputs the public key. All our algorithms take the global parameters params as input, even when this is not explicitly specified. -Encryption. The probabilistic encryption algorithm c ← HE.Enc(pk, μ) takes the public key pk and a message μ ∈ R M and outputs a ciphertext c. The only security notion we consider in this work is semantic security, namely, security with respect to passive adversaries [Goldwasser and Micali 1984] . We use its widely known formulation as IND-CPA security, defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (CPA Security). A scheme HE is IND-CPA secure if for any polynomial time adversary (A, B), there is a negligible function negl whose advantage, defined as follows, is negligible:
where the probabilities are over the random choice of sk ← HE.PublicKeyGen(params) and pk ← HE.PublicKeyGen(params, sk).
We move on to define the homomorphism property. Note that we do not define the correctness of the scheme as a separate property, but rather (some form of) correctness will follow from our homomorphism properties.
We start by defining F-homomorphism, which is homomorphism with respect to a specified class F of functions. This notion is sometimes also referred to as "somewhat homomorphism". (The representation of the function f is an important issue. Since the representation can vary between schemes, we leave this issue outside of this syntactic definition. We remark, however, that in this work, f will be represented by an arithmetic circuit over GF(2).) Definition 2.4 (F-Homomorphism). Let F = {F λ } λ∈N be a class of functions (together with their respective representations). A scheme HE is F-homomorphic (or, homomorphic for the class F) if for any sequence of functions f λ ∈ F λ and respective inputs μ 1 , . . . , μ ∈ M (where M is the message space, and = (λ)), it holds that Pr HE.Dec(sk, HE.Eval(pk, f , c 1 ,
where the global parameters params ← HE.Setup(1 λ ), the secret and public keys are generated as sk ← HE.SecretKeyGen(params), pk ← HE.PublicKeyGen(params, sk), and the ciphertexts c i ← HE.Enc(pk, μ i ).
We point out two important properties that is preceding definition does not require. First of all, we do not require that the ciphertexts c i are decryptable themselves, only that they become decryptable after homomorphic evaluation. While this may seem strange at first, this notion of somewhat homomorphism is all that is really required in order to bootstrap into full homomorphism and it also makes our schemes easier to describe. Note that one can always perform a "blank" homomorphic operation and then decrypt, so functionality is not hurt.
Second, we do not require that the output of HE.Eval undergo additional homomorphic evaluation. This is termed "1-hop homomorphism" in Gentry et al. [2010] .
Before we define full homomorphism, let us define the notion of compactness.
Definition 2.5 (Compactness). A homomorphic scheme HE is compact if there exists a polynomial s = s(λ) such that the output length of HE.Eval(· · · ) is at most s-bits long (regardless of f or the number of inputs).
Note that an F-homomorphic scheme is not necessarily compact.
We give the minimal definition of fully homomorphic encryption, which suffices for most applications.
Definition 2.6 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption). A scheme HE is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all arithmetic circuits over GF (2) .
As in the definition of F homomorphism, one could require that the outputs of HE.Eval could again be used as inputs for homomorphic evaluation (multihop homomorphism). Indeed, any bootstrappable scheme (see Section 2.3), including ours, has this additional property. However, due to the complexity of the formal definition in this case, we refrain from presenting a formal definition.
An important relaxation of fully homomorphic encryption is the following.
Definition 2.7 (Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption).
A leveled, fully homomorphic encryption scheme is a homomorphic scheme where the HE.SecretKeyGen gets an additional input 1 L (now sk ← HE.SecretKeyGen(params, 1 L )), and the resulting scheme is homomorphic for all depth-L binary arithmetic circuits. The bound s(λ) on the ciphertext length must remain independent of L.
Most of this article will focus on the construction of a leveled fully homomorphic scheme in the sense that the parameters of the scheme depend (polynomially) on the depth of the circuits that the scheme is capable of evaluating. In most cases, the only parameter of the scheme that becomes dependent on L is the bit-length of the public key pk.
Gentry's Bootstrapping Technique
In this section, we formally define the notion of a bootstrappable encryption scheme and present Gentry's bootstrapping theorem [Gentry 2009a [Gentry , 2009b which implies that a bootstrappable scheme can be converted into a fully homomorphic one.
Definition 2.8 (Bootstrappable Encryption Scheme). Let HE be F-homomorphic, and let f add and f mult be the the augmented decryption functions of the scheme defined as Namely, the scheme can homomorphically evaluate f add and f mult .
We describe two variants of Gentry's bootstrapping theorem. The first implies leveled, fully homomorphic encryption but requires no additional assumption, where the second makes an additional (weak) circular security assumption and achieves the stronger (non-leveled) variant of Definition 2.6.
The first variant follows. Specifically, the leveled homomorphic scheme is such that only the length of the evaluation key depends on the level L. All other parameters of the scheme are distributed identically regardless of the value of L.
For the second variant, we need to define circular security.
Definition 2.10 (Weak Circular Security).
A public key encryption scheme (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is weakly circular secure if it is IND-CPA secure, even for an adversary with auxiliary information containing encryptions of all secret key bits:
Namely, no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish an encryption of 0 from an encryption of 1, even given the additional information.
We can now state the second theorem.
THEOREM 2.11 [GENTRY 2009A, 2009B] . If there exists a bootstrappable scheme that is also weakly circular secure, then there exists a fully homomorphic encryption scheme as per Definition 2.6.
Finally, we want to make a statement regarding the ciphertext length of a bootstrapped scheme. The transformations in Gentry [2009a Gentry [ , 2009b guarantees something stronger than what we claimed in Lemmas 2.9 and 2.11. Namely, starting from a bootstrappable scheme HE, one can construct a (leveled) FHE scheme FHE whose encryption algorithm FHE.Enc and evaluation algorithm FHE.Eval produce ciphertexts of the same length as HE.Eval (regardless of the length of the ciphertext produced by HE.Enc).
Learning with Errors Problem
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [2005] as a generalization of "learning parity with noise". For positive integers n and q ≥ 2, a vector s ∈ Z n q , and a probability distribution χ on Z q , let A s,χ be the distribution obtained by choosing a vector a ← Z n q uniformly at random and a noise term e ← χ , and outputting (a, a, s + e) ∈ Z n q × Z q . A formal definition follows.
Definition 2.12 (LWE). For an integer q = q(n) and an error distribution χ = χ(n) over Z q , the learning with errors problem LWE n,m,q,χ is defined as follows: Given m independent samples from A s,χ (for some s ∈ Z n q ), output s with noticeable probability. The (average-case) decision variant of the LWE problem, denoted DLWE n,m,q,χ , is to distinguish (with nonnegligible advantage) m samples chosen according to A s,χ (for uniformly random s ← Z n q ), from m samples chosen according to the uniform distribution over Z n q × Z q . We denote by DLWE n,q,χ the variant where the adversary gets oracle access to A s,χ and is not a-priori bounded in the number of samples.
For an algorithm B and security parameter λ, we denote
For cryptographic applications, we are primarily interested in the average case decision problem DLWE, where s ← Z n q . There are known quantum [Regev 2005 ] and classical [Peikert 2009 ] reductions between DLWE n,m,q,χ and approximating short vector problems in worst-case lattices. Specifically, these reductions take χ to be (discretized versions of) the Gaussian distribution. These distributions can easily be made B-bounded for an appropriate B by rejection sampling without effecting the validity of the reduction. Since the exact distribution χ does not matter for our results, we state a corollary of the results of Regev [2005] and Peikert [2009] in terms of the bound on the distribution. We refer the reader to Regev [2005] and Peikert [2009] for the formal definition of these lattice problems, as they have no direct connection to this work. We only note here that the best-known algorithms for these problems run in time nearly exponential in the dimension n [Ajtai et al. 2001; Micciancio and Voulgaris 2010] . More generally, the best algorithms that approximate these problems to within a factor of 2 k run in time 2Õ (n/k) [Schnorr 1987] . Applebaum et al. [2009] showed that if LWE is hard for the preceding distribution of s, then it is also hard when s's coefficients are sampled according to the noise distribution χ .
Ring Learning with Errors Problem
The ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem was introduced by Lyubashevsky et al. [2010] . We will use a simplified special-case version of the problem that is easier to work with [Regev 2010; Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011a] .
Definition 2.14 (RLWE). For security parameter λ, let f ( The RLWE d,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (a i , b i ) uniformly from R 2 q . In the second distribution, one first draws s ← R q uniformly and then samples
q by sampling a i ← R q uniformly, e i ← χ , and setting
The RLWE problem is useful, because the well-established shortest vector problem (SVP) over ideal lattices can be reduced to it, specifically as follows. 
THEOREM 2.15 (LYUBASHEVSKY ET AL. [2010]). For any d that is a power of 2, ring R
Typically, to use RLWE with a cryptosystem, one chooses the noise distribution χ according to a Gaussian distribution, where vectors sampled according to this distribution have length only poly(d) with overwhelming probability. This Gaussian distribution may need to be ellipsoidal for certain reductions to go through [Lyubashevsky et al. 2010] . It has been shown for RLWE that one can equivalently assume that s is alternatively sampled from the noise distribution χ [Lyubashevsky et al. 2010 ].
General Learning with Errors Problem
The learning with errors (LWE) problem and the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem are syntactically identical, aside from using different rings (the ring of rational integers versus a polynomial ring) and different vector dimensions over those rings (n = poly(λ) for LWE, but n = 1 for RLWE). To simplify our presentation, we define a General Learning with Errors (GLWE ) Problem and describe a single GLWEbased FHE scheme, rather than presenting essentially the same scheme twice, once for each of our two concrete instantiations.
Definition 2.16 (GLWE). For security parameter
) and R q = R/qR, and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The GLWE n,f ,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (a i , b i ) uniformly from R n+1 q . In the second distribution, one first draws s ← R n q uniformly and then samples
uniformly, e i ← χ , and setting b i = a i , s + e i . The GLWE n,f ,q,χ assumption is that the GLWE n,f ,q,χ problem is infeasible.
LWE is simply GLWE instantiated with d = 1. RLWE is GLWE instantiated with n = 1. Interestingly, as far as we know, instances of GLWE between these extremes have not been explored. One would suspect that GLWE is hard for any (n, d) such that n · d = (λ log(q/B)), where B is a bound (with overwhelming probability) on the length of elements output by χ . For fixed n · d, perhaps GLWE gradually becomes harder as n increases (if it is true that general lattice problems are harder than ideal lattice problems), whereas increasing d is probably often preferable for efficiency.
If q is much larger than B, the associated GLWE problem is believed to be easier (i.e., there is less security). Previous FHE schemes required q/B to be subexponential in n or d to give room for the noise to grow as homomorphic operations (especially multiplication) are performed. In our FHE scheme without bootstrapping, q/B will be exponential in the number of circuit levels to be evaluated. However, since the decryption circuit can be evaluated in logarithmic depth, the bootstrapped version of our scheme will only need q/B to be quasipolynomial, and we thus base security on lattice problems for quasipolynomial approximation factors.
By the GLWE assumption, the distribution {(a i , a i , s + t · e i )} is computationally indistinguishable from uniform for any t relatively prime to q. This fact will be convenient for encryption, where, for example, a message m may be encrypted as (a, a, s + 2e + m), and this fact can be used to argue that the second component of this message is indistinguishable from random (as shown in, e.g., [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011b] .)
A Useful Lemma
We will use the following lemma that converts Boolean circuits into arithmetic circuits of roughly the same size and depth, in Section 6. PROOF. The circuit C will be defined by applying the following transformation on C. Every × gate in C is left unchanged in C . Any + gate with input wires a, b in C is replaced by the gadget a + b − ab. Note that this gadget has size 3 and depth 2; therefore, the size of C is at most 3s and its depth is at most 2d.
The correctness of the construction follows, since for all a, b ∈ {0, 1} and for any integer p ≥ 2, the following holds.
(
A straightforward inductive argument shows that for all
for all p, and the result follows.
TRADING OFF DEGREE FOR DIMENSION IN GLWE
In this section, we present a new technique, termed ring switching in follow-up work [Gentry et al. 2012a ], which allows trading off the parameters d and n of the GLWE problem. In particular, we show that these parameters can be traded off subject to the invariant that n · d remains constant. We note that, as per Definition 2.16, d must be a power of 2. As previously mentioned, this technique was generalized and extended in Gentry et al. [2012a] .
Before moving on to the technical details, let us provide some motivation for trading off the degree and dimension. We show in the next section how to devise homomorphic encryption scheme with increased homomorphic capacity by increasing the degree of the underlying ring. However, this will incur an increase in the decryption complexity of the scheme, rendering it noncompact (see Definition 2.5). This is solved by first trading off the degree for dimension, as described, next, and then using the dimension reduction technique of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] to reduce the dimension, which will bring the final ciphertext to the same GLWE parameters regardless of the extent of the homomorphic evaluation.
We proceed by describing our technique. Namely, we show that there is an interplay between the dimension n of a GLWE problem and the degree d of the modulus polynomial. We show that an GLWE n,x d +1,q,χ ciphertext can be efficiently broken into two GLWE 2n,x d/2 +1,q,χ ciphertexts. We slightly deviate from the notation in the body of the article and denote GLWE n,d,q,χ to denote GLWE n,x d +1,q,χ (recall that d is always a power of 2). We further denote
Decomposing Ring Elements. We begin by presenting a formal decomposition of elements from R q,d into elements of R q,d/2 . We show that each element a = a(x) ∈ R q,d
can be represented using a (even) , a (odd) ∈ R q,d/2 . Recalling that an element in R q,d is a polynomial with d coefficients over Z q , the task seems very simple. We embed half of the coefficients of the polynomial a as coefficients of a (even) and the other half as coefficients of a (odd) . However, in order to preserve an algebraic structure over the the new elements, it is critical that the coefficients are divided between them in a special way.
Specifically, we define a (even) , a (odd) to be the elements of R q,d/2 for which
In other words, a (even) assumes the even coefficients of a, and a (odd) the odd ones. To see that the algebraic properties are preserved, suppose we have an equation
Noting that the parity of a power of x cannot change by reducing modulo x d + 1 (since d is a power of 2 and thus always even), it follows that we can separate odd and even powers in the previous expression:
These equations are still over the ring R q,d . In order to switch down to the ring R q,d/2 , we consider the following fact. In general, if w(
, that is, modulo q and x d/2 + 1. This follows syntactically by replacing x 2 everywhere with x.
Therefore, we have that the following holds over R q,d/2 :
Decomposing Vectors. . The preceding technique can be applied in a straightforward way to decompose vectors of ring elements. This is done by decomposing each of the elements in the vector, yielding an odd vector that corresponds to all of the odd components of the elements, and an even vector corresponding to the even components. In order to complete our claim, we show that the inner product of the original vector can be expressed using the inner products of the decomposed vectors. Let a, s ∈ R n q,d , and letb = a, s . Applying the decomposition to each component as just described yields vectors a (even) ,
Indeed, the original inner product breaks into two inner products of a reduced ring but of vectors of double the dimension. To apply this to GLWE, we need to consider the noisy version, b = a, s + e, which is handled exactly as before but with the e also decomposing into e (odd) and e (even) . The preceding step can be applied recursively k times to trade off GLWE with parameters (n, d), for GLWE with parameters (n · 2 k , d/2 k ).
LEVELED FHE WITHOUT BOOTSTRAPPING FROM LWE
The plan of this section is to present our leveled FHE without bootstrapping construction in modular steps. First, we describe a plain LWE-based encryption scheme with no homomorphic operations. Next, we augment the plain scheme with variants of the relinearization and dimension reduction techniques of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011b] . Finally, in Section 4.4, we lay out our full-fledged construction of FHE without bootstrapping.
The Basic Encryption Scheme
We begin by presenting a basic encryption scheme with no homomorphic operations.
Let λ be the security parameter, representing our goal of achieving 2 λ -security against known attacks. (λ = 100 is, e.g., a reasonable value.) Let R = R(λ) be a ring. Specifically, we will be interested in two instantiations:
(1) R = Z, which will give us a scheme based on (standard) LWE, and
is a power of 2, which will give us a scheme based on RLWE with the appropriate parameteres.
Let the dimension n = n(λ), the degree d = d(λ), an odd positive integer modulus q = q(λ), and a noise distribution χ = χ(λ) over R be parameters of the system which come from the LWE (resp. RLWE) assumption. Let R q := R/qR. For simplicity, assume for now that the plaintext space is R 2 := R/2R, though we will discuss the issue of supporting larger plaintext spaces in the sequel. In addition to the usual LWE (resp. RLWE) parameters, we will use an additional parameter N = N(λ) = n · polylog(q) which we will discuss following the description of the scheme.
Even though this only becomes important when we introduce homomorphic operations, we go ahead and stipulate here that the noise distribution χ will be supported over a set of ring elements with small norm, namely, the following.
(1) In the LWE case, the support of χ will be [ −B, . . . , B] for some B = B(λ). We will set B to be as small as possible (while maintaining security), and (2) In the RLWE case, the support of χ will be the set of all ring elements with norm at most B = B(λ).
The Basic Encryption Scheme. We now present the plain encryption scheme, which is inspired by the schemes of Regev [2005] in the LWE case, or Lyubashevsky et al. [2010] in the RLWE case. In the following description, we describe both the LWE and RLWE schemes using a common framework, highlighting the salient differences whenever appropriate.
The scheme E = (E.Setup, E.SecretKeyGen, E.PublicKeyGen, E.Enc, E.Dec) works as follows.
-E.Setup(1 λ ). Determine the system parameters as a function of the security parameter λ. That is, set d = d(λ) to be the degree of the ring, and n = n(λ) to be the dimension. In particular, in the LWE-based instantiation, the underlying ring R = Z (with degree d = 1), n will be determined based on the security parameter, and we will work over Z n q . In the RLWE-based instantiation, the underlying ring
, the dimension n = 1, and we will work over Z q [ x] /f (x) . Set the odd modulus q = q(λ), the noise distribution χ = χ(λ), and N = N(λ) = n · polylog(q). Output params = (R, d, n, q, χ , N) . 
where the third equality holds because we will ensure that e and r have small enough entries so that that the value m + 2r T e does not wrap around modulo q. It is straightforward to base security on the LWE or RLWE assumptions, for appropriate parameters (see, e.g., [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011b; Lyubashevsky et al. 2010; Regev 2005] ). We will now sketch the main ideas. First, note that if an attacker can distinguish the public key A from a uniformly random matrix over R N×(n+1) q , then the attacker can be used to solve the LWE (resp. RLWE) problem. Therefore, assuming the LWE (resp. RLWE) problem is hard, an attacker cannot efficiently distinguish the public key from a uniformly random matrix. Second, if A was indeed chosen uniformly from R N×(n+1) q , the encryption procedure generates ciphertexts that are statistically independent from m, either by the leftover hash lemma (in the case of LWE, or by Micciancio's regularity lemma [Micciancio 2007 ] in the case of RLWE. Put together, the attacker has negligible advantage in guessing the message m.
For the LWE case, it suffices to take N > 2n log q [Regev 2005 ]. For RLWE, it does not necessarily work just to take N > 2n log q = 2 log q due to subtle distributional issues. In particular, the problem is that R q may have many zero divisors. Micciancio's regularity lemma assures us that if A ∈ R N×(n+1) q and r ∈ R N 2 are uniform, then r T A has negligible statistical distance from uniform when N = log(q · λ ω(1) ).
To achieve 2 λ security against known lattice attacks, one must have n · d = (λ · log(q/B)), where B is a bound on the length of the noise. Since n or d depends logarithmically on q, and since the distribution χ (and hence B) depends sublinearly on n or d, the distribution χ (and hence B) depends sublogarithmically on q. This dependence is weak, and one should think of the noise distribution as being essentially independent of q.
Generalizing to Larger Plaintext Spaces. The scheme just described transparently handles plaintext spaces larger than R 2 . For example, to encrypt a message m from the plaintext domain R t , where t is relatively prime to q, we simply change the encryption to (a, a, s + te + m). Of course, this also requires a slightly different analysis of how the error in the ciphertext grows with homomorphic operations.
An Alternate Encryption Scheme Based on RLWE. While we think our description of encryption is useful in that it highlights the high-level similarity of LWE and RLWE, the distributional issues previously discussed make it more desirable, in practice, to use a slightly different approach to encryption in the RLWE setting. In particular, Lyubashevsky et al. [2010] streamline public key generation and encryption in the RLWE setting as follows.
-E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk). As before, except N = 1. -E.Enc(params, pk, m). To encrypt a message m ∈ R 2 , set m := (m, 0) ∈ R 2 q , sample r ← χ and a row vector e ← χ 2 . Output the ciphertext c := m + 2 · e + r · A ∈ R 2 q . The security of LPR encryption relies on RLWE: assuming RLWE, the public key A is computationally indistinguishable from uniform in R 2 q . Then, invoking the RLWE assumption once again, the two ring elements m + a 1 · r + e 1 and a 2 · r + e 2 of the ciphertext generated during encryption are pseudorandom.
In what follows, some of our schemes will invoke the function E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk, N) with an integer parameter N. In that case, it invokes the first version of E.PublicKeyGen (not the alternate LPR version presented above) with the specified value of N.
We remark that an analogous approach can be used to design an alternate encryption scheme based on LWE.
Key Switching
We start by reminding the reader that in the basic GLWE-based encryption scheme, the decryption equation Here, x ⊗ x is the tensoring of x with itself, increasing the dimension to the square of the dimension of x's. Using this interpretation, the ciphertext represented by the coefficients of the linear equation L long is decryptable by the long secret key s ⊗ s via the usual dot product. Of course, we cannot continue increasing the dimension like this indefinitely and preserve efficiency.
Thus, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan convert the long ciphertext represented by the linear equation long and decryptable by the long tensored secret key s ⊗ s into a shorter ciphertext c 2 that is decryptable by a different secret key s 2 . (The secret keys need to be different to avoid a circular security issue, described in Section 2.3). Encryptions of s 1 ⊗ s 1 under s 2 are provided in the public key as a hint to facilitate this conversion. They call this the relinearization procedure.
The starting point of our key switching procedure is to observe that Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's relinearization procedure is actually quite a bit more general. It can be used to not only reduce the dimension of the ciphertext, but more generally, can be used to transform a ciphertext c 1 that is decryptable under one secret key vector s 1 to a different ciphertext c 2 that encrypts the same message, but is now decryptable under a second secret key vector s 2 . The vectors c 2 , s 2 may not necessarily be of lower degree or dimension than c 1 , s 1 . Because of this generality, we prefer to call this the key switching procedure, which we now describe in detail.
Two Useful Subroutines. The key switching procedure will use some subroutines that, given two vectors c and s, expand these vectors to get longer (higher-dimensional) vectors c and s such that c , s = c, s mod q.
-BitDecomp(c ∈ R n q , q) decomposes c into its bit representation. Namely, write c = log q j=0
We observe the following elementary fact.
LEMMA 4.1. For vectors c, s of equal length, we have
BitDecomp(c, q), Powersof2(s, q) = c, s mod q .
PROOF. The proof follows by a simple calculation from the definitions of the previous procedures BitDecomp and Powersof2. In particular, we have
We remark that this obviously generalizes to decompositions with respect to bases other than the powers of 2. Also, as an optimization, if one knows a priori that c has coefficients in [ 0, B] for B q, then BitDecomp can be optimized in the obvious way to output a shorter decomposition in R n· log B 2 .
The Key Switching Procedure. Key switching consists of two procedures: first, an algorithm SwitchKeyGen(s 1 , s 2 , n 1 , n 2 , q), which takes as input the two secret key vectors, the respective dimensions of these vectors, and the modulus q, and outputs some auxiliary information τ s 1 →s 2 that enables the switching; and second, an algorithm SwitchKey(τ s 1 →s 2 , c 1 , n 1 , n 2 , q), that takes this auxiliary information and a ciphertext encrypted under s 1 and outputs a new ciphertext c 2 that encrypts the same message under the secret key s 2 . (In the following, we often suppress the additional arguments n 1 , n 2 , q.)
q to A's first column to get a matrix B. Output τ s 1 →s 2 = B.
q . Note that, in SwitchKeyGen, the matrix A basically consists of encryptions of 0 under the key s 2 . Then, pieces of the key s 1 are added to these encryptions of 0. Thus, in some sense, the matrix B consists of encryptions of pieces of s 1 (in a certain format) under the key s 2 . We now establish that the key switching procedures are meaningful, in the sense that they preserve the correctness of decryption under the new key. Let s 1 , s 2 , q, A, PROOF. We prove this by the following sequence of equalities:
where the first equality is by the definition of SwitchKey, the second by the definition of SwitchKeyGen, and the last by Lemma 4.1.
Note that the dot product of BitDecomp(c 1 ) and e 2 is small, since BitDecomp(c 1 ) is in R N 2 . Overall, the consequence of this lemma is that c 2 is a valid encryption of m under key s 2 , with noise that is larger by a small additive factor.
We will need in the sequel the following lemma which says that the key switching parameter generated by SwitchKeyGen(s 1 , s 2 ) is computationally indistinguishable from random for any s 1 ∈ R n 1 q and a uniformly random s 2 ∈ R n 2 q . This is simply because of the properties of the basic scheme E, which states that the matrix A ← E.PublicKeyGen(s 2 , N) is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. 
q , the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable (even to a distinguisher that knows s 1 ):
Here, the randomness is over the choice of s 2 ← R n 2 q , and the coins of E.PublicKeyGen and SwitchKeyGen.
As a final remark in this section, we note that in the follow-up work of Gentry et al. [2012c] , which aimed at a practical implementation of this work, the authors chose to not use bit decomposition in the key switching process. Instead, they control the noise in a different method whose asymptotic performance may be worse, but which turns out to perform better in practice.
Modulus Switching
Suppose c is a valid encryption of m under s modulo q (i.e., m =[ [ c, s ] q ] 2 ), and that s is a short vector. Suppose also that c is basically a simple scaling of c-in particular, c is the R-vector closest to (p/q) · c such that c = c mod 2. Then, it turns out (subject to some qualifications) that c is a valid encryption of m under s modulo p using the usual decryption equation, that is, m =[ [ c , s ] p ] 2 ! In other words, we can change the inner modulus in the decryption equation (e.g., to a smaller number) while preserving the correctness of decryption under the same secret key. The essence of this modulus switching idea, a variant of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's modulus reduction technique, is formally captured in Lemma 4.6. Definition 4.4 (Scale). For integer vector x and integers q > p > m, we define x ← Scale(x, q, p, r) to be the R-vector closest to (p/q) · x that satisfies x = x mod r. 1 norm). The (usual) norm 1 (s) over the reals equals i s [ i] . We extend this to our ring R as follows:
1 (s) for s ∈ R n is defined as i s [ i] . LEMMA 4.6. Let d be the degree of the ring (e.g., d = 1 when R = Z). Let q > p > r be positive integers satisfying q = p = 1 mod r. Let c ∈ R n and c ← Scale (c, q, p, r) . Then, for any s ∈ R n with [ c, s
Note that e p =[ c , s ] p modp. We claim that e p is so small that e p =[ c , s ] p . We have 
(s). Then c ← Scale(c, q, p, r) is an encryption of of bit m under key s for modulus p, that is, m =[ [ c, s ] p ] r . The noise e p =[ c , s ] p of the new ciphertext has magnitude at most
1 (s). Amazingly, assuming p is smaller than q and s has coefficients that are small in relation to q, this trick permits the evaluator to reduce the magnitude of the noise without knowing the secret key! (Of course, this is also what Gentry's bootstrapping transformation accomplishes, but in a much more complicated way.)
(Leveled) FHE Based without Bootstrapping
We now present our leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Given the machinery that we have described in the previous subsections, the scheme itself is remarkably simple.
In our scheme, we will use a parameter L indicating the number of levels of arithmetic circuit that we want our FHE scheme to be capable of evaluating. Note that this is an exponential improvement over prior schemes that would typically use a parameter d indicating the degree of the polynomials to be evaluated.
-FHE. Setup(1 λ , 1 L ) . Takes as input the security parameter and a number of levels L.
Let μ = μ(λ, L, b) = θ(log λ + log L) be a parameter that we will specify in detail later. For j = L (input level of circuit) to 0 (output level), run params j ← E.Setup(1 λ , 1 (j+1)·μ , b) to obtain a ladder of parameters, including a ladder of decreasing moduli from q L ((L + 1) · μ bits) down to q 0 (μ bits). (The ring degree d j , dimension n j , and noise distribution χ j do not necessarily need to vary (decrease) with the circuit level. In the following procedure, we allow n j and χ j to vary but defer the case of decreasing d j to Section 3.) -FHE.KeyGen({params j }). For j = L down to 0, do the following.
(1) Run s j ← E.SecretKeyGen(params j ) and A j ← E.PublicKeyGen(params j , s j ).
, that is, s j is a tensoring of s j with itself whose coefficients are each the product of two coefficients of
The secret key sk consists of the s j 's and the public key pk consists of the A j 's and (params, sk, c) . Suppose the ciphertext is under key s j . Run E.Dec(params j , s j , c). (The ciphertext could be augmented with an index indicating which level it belongs to.) -FHE.Eval (pk, f , c 1 , . . . , c ) . Take as input a circuit f with inputs, as well as ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c . We will assume without loss of generality that f is a leveled circuit composed of layers of alternating addition and multiplication gates. FHE.Eval will invoke FHE.Add and FHE.Mult described next to compute the circuit layer by layer, starting from the inputs. In addition, after each multiplication layer, it will invoke the ciphertext refreshing procedure FHE.Refresh to reduce the noise in the ciphertexts and move it to a different level. These procedures are described in detail next. Remark 4.8. We mention the obvious fact that since addition increases the noise much more slowly than multiplication, one does not necessarily need to refresh after additions, even high fan-in ones.
The key step of our new FHE scheme is the Refresh procedure. If the modulus q j−1 is chosen to be smaller than q j by a sufficient multiplicative factor, then Corollary 4.7 implies that the noise of the ciphertext output by Refresh is smaller than that of the input ciphertext, that is, the ciphertext will indeed be a "refreshed" encryption of the same value. We elaborate on this analysis in the next section.
One can reasonably argue that this scheme is not FHE without bootstrapping, since τ s j →s j−1 can be viewed as an encrypted secret key, and the SwitchKey step can viewed as a homomorphic evaluation of the decryption function. We prefer not to view the SwitchKey step this way. While there is some high-level resemblance, the low-level details are very different, a difference that becomes tangible in the much better asymptotic performance. To the extent that it performs decryption, SwitchKey does so very efficiently using an efficient (not bitwise) representation of the secret key that allows this step to be computed in quasilinear time for the RLWE instantiation, below the quadratic lower bound for bootstrapping. Certainly SwitchKey does not use the usual ponderous approach of representing the decryption function as a boolean circuit to be traversed homomorphically. Another difference is that the SwitchKey step does not actually reduce the noise level (as bootstrapping does); rather, the noise is reduced by the Scale step.
PARAMETER SETTINGS: CORRECTNESS, PERFORMANCE, AND SECURITY
Here, we will show how to set the parameters of our FHE scheme to get the desired homomorphic capacity. Mostly, this involves analyzing each of the steps within FHE.Add and FHE.Mult-namely, the addition or multiplication itself, and then the SwitchKey and Scale steps that make up FHE.Refresh-to establish that the output of each step is a decryptable ciphertext with bounded noise. This analysis will lead to concrete suggestions for how to set the ladder of moduli and to asymptotic bounds on the performance of the scheme.
Let us begin by considering how much noise FHE.Enc introduces initially. Throughout, B χ denotes a bound such that R-elements sampled from the the noise distribution χ have length at most B χ (with probability 1).
The Initial Noise from FHE.Enc
Recall that FHE.Enc simply invokes the encryption algorithm for the underlying public-key encryption scheme, namely, E.Enc, for suitable parameters params L that depend on λ and L. In turn, the noise of ciphertexts output by E.Enc depends on the noise of the initial ciphertext(s) (the encryption(s) of 0) implicit in the matrix A output by E.PublicKeyGen, whose noise distribution is dictated by the distribution χ . 
Euclidean norm of the noise in ciphertexts output by FHE.Enc is at most
PROOF. We have A · s = 2e, where s ← E.SecretKeyGen, A ← E.PublicKeyGen(s, N), and e ← χ N . Recall that encryption works as follows: c ← m + A T r mod q, where r ∈ R N 2 . We have that the noise of this ciphertext is [ c, s ] q =[ m+2 r, e ] q . The magnitude of this element is at most
One can easily obtain a similar small bound on the noise of ciphertexts output by LPR encryption in the RLWE setting: a small polynomial in the security parameter λ, L, and log q.
The correctness of decryption for ciphertexts output by FHE.Enc, assuming the noise bound is less than q/2, follows directly from the correctness of the basic encryption and decryption algorithms E.Enc and E.Dec. 
Correctness and Performance of
is simply the dot product c i , x . To multiply together two ciphertexts, one multiplies together these two linear equations to obtain a quadratic equation 
The computation needed to compute the tensored ciphertext c 3 isÕ(d j n 2 j log q j ). For the RLWE instantiation, since n j = 1 and since (as we will see) d j (resp. log q j ) depend only quasilinearly (resp. logarithmically) on the security parameter and linearly (resp. linearly) on L, the computation here is only quasilinear in the security parameter. For the LWE instantiation, the computation is quasiquadratic.
Correctness and Performance of FHE.Refresh
FHE.Refresh consists of two steps: Switch Keys and Switch Moduli. We address each of these steps in turn.
Correctness and Performance of the Switch-Key
Step. In the Switch-Keys step, we take as input a ciphertext c under key s j for modulus q j and set c 1 ← SwitchKey(τ s j →s j−1 , c, q j ) , a ciphertext under the key s j−1 for modulus q j . In Lemma 4.2, we proved the correctness of key switching and showed that the noise grows by the additive factor 2 BitDecomp(c, q j ), e , where BitDecomp(c, q j ) is a (short) bit-vector and e is a (short and fresh) noise vector with elements sampled from χ . In particular, if the noise originally had norm B, then after the Switch-Keys step, it has norm at most
· log q j is the dimension of BitDecomp(c, q j ). We capture the correctness of the Switch-Key step in the following lemma. The Switch-Key step involves multiplying the transpose of w j -dimensional vector BitDecomp(c, q j ) with a w j × (n j + 1) matrix B. This computation isÕ(d j n 3 j log 2 q j ). Still this is quasilinear in the RLWE instantiation.
Correctness and Performance of the Switch-Moduli
Step. The Switch-Moduli step takes as input a ciphertext c 1 under the secret bit-vector s j−1 for the modulus q j , and outputs the ciphertext c 2 ← Scale(c 1 , q j , q j−1 , 2), which we claim to be a ciphertext under key s j−1 for modulus q j−1 . Note that s j−1 is a short secret key. By Corollary 4.7 and using the fact that 1 (s j−1 ) ≤ (n j−1 + 1) · B χ , the following is true: if the noise of c 1 has norm at most
, then correctness is preserved and the noise of c 2 is bounded by
Of course, the key feature of this step for our purposes is that switching moduli may reduce the size of the moduli when q j−1 < q j .
We capture the correctness of the Switch-Moduli step in the following lemma. The computation in the Switch-Moduli step isÕ(d j n j−1 log q j ).
Putting the Pieces Together: Parameters, Correctness, Performance
So far we have established that the scheme is correct, assuming that the noise does not wrap modulo q j or q j−1 . Now we need to show that we can set the parameters of the scheme to ensure that such wrapping never occurs. Our strategy for setting the parameters is to pick a universal bound B on the noise length, and then prove, for all j, that a valid ciphertext under key s j for modulus q j has noise length at most B. This bound B is quite small: polynomial in λ and log q L , where q L is the largest modulus in our ladder. It is clear that such a bound B holds for fresh ciphertexts output by FHE.Enc. (Recall the discussion from Section 4.1, where we explained that we use a noise distribution χ that is essentially independent of the modulus.) The remainder of the proof is by induction, that is, we will show that if the bound holds for two ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 at level j, our lemmas imply that the bound also holds for the ciphertext c ← FHE.Mult(pk, c 1 , c 2 ) at level j − 1. (FHE.Mult increases the noise strictly more in the worst case than FHE.Add for any reasonable choice of parameters.) Specifically, after the first step of FHE.Mult (without the Refresh step), the noise has length at most γ R · B 2 . Then, we apply the SwitchKey function, which introduces an additive term η SwitchKey,j . Finally, we apply the Scale function. The noise is now at most
where η Scale,j is another additive term. Now we want to choose our parameters so that this bound is at most B. Suppose we set our ladder of moduli and the bound B such that the following two properties hold.
Then we have
It only remains to set our ladder of moduli and B so that Properties 1 and 2 hold. Unfortunately, there is some circularity in Properties 1 and 2: q L depends on B, which depends on q L , albeit only polylogarithmically. However, it is easy to see that this circularity is not fatal, for example, by setting
We can therefore set q j as a modulus having (j + 1) · μ bits for some μ = θ(log λ + log L) with small hidden constant.
Overall, we have that q L , the largest modulus used in the system, is θ(L · (log λ + log L)) bits, and d L · n L must be approximately that number times λ for 2 λ security.
The dependence of the complexity on L emerges mostly from its dependence on log(q). The dominant term is quadratic, coming from the complexity of the switch-key operation.
THEOREM 5.6. For some μ = θ(log λ+log L), FHE is a correct L-leveled FHE scheme: specifically, it correctly evaluates circuits of depth L with Add and Mult gates over R 2 . (Leveled) Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Bootstrapping 13:27
The bottom line is that we have a RLWE-based leveled FHE scheme with per-gate computation that is only quasilinear in the security parameter, albeit with somewhat high dependence on the number of levels in the circuit.
Let us pause at this point to reconsider the performance of previous FHE schemes in comparison to our new scheme. Specifically, as we discussed in the Introduction, in previous SWHE schemes, the ciphertext size is at leastÕ (λ · d 2 ) , where d is the degree of the circuit being evaluated. One may view our new scheme as a very powerful SWHE scheme in which this dependence on degree has been replaced with a similar dependence on depth. (Recall the degree of a circuit may be exponential in its depth.) Since polynomial-size circuits have polynomial depth, which is certainly not true of degree, our scheme can efficiently evaluate arbitrary circuits without resorting to bootstrapping.
Security
The security of FHE follows by a standard hybrid argument from the security of E, the basic scheme described in Section 4.1. For the sake of completeness, we will present the full reduction from the hardness of GLWE. At a high level, the idea is this: the view of a CPA adversary for our scheme is very similar to that for the basic scheme E, except that our adversary also gets to see the key-switching parameters. However, the key-switching parameters are made up of a sequence of outputs of the SwitchKeyGen algorithm which, by Lemma 4.3, are indistinguishable from uniform. A formal proof follows by a hybrid argument.
PROOF. We proceed with the proof using a sequence of hybrids. Let A be an IND-CPA adversary for FHE. We consider a series of hybrids, where Adv H [ A] denotes the success probability of A in hybrid H.
-Hybrid H 0 . This is identical to the IND-CPA game, where the adversary gets a properly distributed public key, generated by FHE.KeyGen, and an encryption of either 0 or 1 computed using FHE.Enc. Recall that the public key consists of the following.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is a polynomial function p(·) such that
The hybrids H are identical to H −1 except that the public key A −1 and the key-switching parameter τ s →s −1 are chosen to be uniformly random from the appropriate domains. We claim that 
by an argument essentially identical to the preceding one.
Note that in H L+1 , all the elements of the public key are uniformly random and independent of the message. Thus, invoking the semantic security of the basic encryption scheme E, we get that
Putting Equations (4), (5), and (6) together, we get
contradicting Equation (3). The theorem follows.
OPTIMIZATIONS: REDUCING THE PER-GATE COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
Despite the fact that the RLWE-based version of our new FHE scheme has per-gate computation only quasilinear in the security parameter, it has a rather large dependence on the number of levels in the circuit (see Theorem 5.6). In this section, we show how to reduce the per-gate computation overhead to quasilinear in the security parameter, independent of the number of levels in the circuit to be evaluated. To this end, we present several significant optimizations. Our first optimization (Section 6.1) is batching. Batching allows us to evaluate a function f homomorphically in parallel on = (λ) blocks of encrypted data, paying only a polylogarithmic (in the security parameter λ) overhead over evaluating f on the unencrypted data. (The overhead is still polynomial in the depth L of the circuit computing f .) Thus, batching allows us to reduce the per-gate computation from quasilinear in the security parameter to polylogarithmic, in an amortized sense. Batching works essentially by packing multiple plaintexts into each ciphertext.
Second, we bring bootstrapping back into the picture as an optimization rather than a necessity (Section 6.2). Bootstrapping allows us to achieve per-gate computation quasiquadratic in the security parameter, independent of the number levels in the circuit being evaluated. Although the dependence on the security parameter has worsened fromÕ(λ) toÕ(λ 2 ), the key win here is that the per-gate computation does not depend on the depth of the circuit any more! This optimization applies in a stand-alone setting where the function is evaluated on a single input.
Finally, we obtain our goal of near-linear per-gate computation overhead (in the security parameter λ) by showing that batching the bootstrapping function is a powerful combination (Section 6.3). With this optimization, circuits that are wide on average, namely, ones whose average width is at least λ, can be evaluated homomorphically with onlyÕ(λ) per-gate computation, independent of the number of levels.
Batching
Suppose we want to evaluate the same function f on blocks of encrypted data. (Or, similarly, suppose we want to evaluate the same encrypted function f on blocks of plaintext data.) Can we do this using less than times the computation needed to evaluate f on one block of data? Can we batch?
For example, consider a keyword search function that returns '1' if the keyword is present in the data and '0' if it is not. The keyword search function is mostly composed of a large number of equality tests that compare the target word w to all of the different subsequences of data; this is followed up by an OR of the equality test results. All of these equality tests involve running the same w-dependent function on different blocks of data. If we could batch these equality tests, it could significantly reduce the computation needed to perform keyword search homomorphically.
If we use bootstrapping as an optimization (see Section 6.2), then obviously we will be running the decryption function homomorphically on multiple blocks of data-namely, the multiple ciphertexts that need to be refreshed. Can we batch the bootstrapping function? If we could, then we might be able to drastically reduce the average per-gate cost of bootstrapping. Smart and Vercauteren [2011] were the first to rigorously analyze batching in the context of FHE. In particular, they observed that ideal-lattice-based (and RLWE-based) ciphertexts can have many plaintext slots, associated to the factorization of the plaintext space into algebraic ideals.
When we apply batching to our new RLWE-based FHE scheme, the results are pretty amazing. Evaluating f homomorphically on = (λ) blocks of encrypted data requires only polylogarithmically (in terms of the security parameter λ) more computation than evaluating f on the unencrypted data. (The overhead is still polynomial in the depth L of the circuit computing f .) As we will see later, for circuits whose levels have average width at least λ, batching the bootstrapping function (i.e., batching homomorphic evaluation of the decryption function) allows us to reduce the per-gate computation of our bootstrapped scheme fromÕ(λ 2 ) toÕ(λ) (independent of L).
To make the exposition a bit simpler, in our RLWE-based instantiation where
, we will not use R 2 as our plaintext space, but instead use a plaintext space R p , prime p = 1 mod 2d, where we have the isomorphism R p ∼ = R p 1 × · · · × R p d of many plaintext spaces (think Chinese remaindering), so that evaluating a function once over R p implicitly evaluates the function many times in parallel over the respective smaller plaintext spaces. The p i 's will be ideals in our ring R = Z[ x] /(x d + 1). (One could still use R 2 as in Smart and Vercauteren [2011] , but the number theory there is a bit more involved.) 6.1.1. Some Number Theory. Let us take a very brief tour of algebraic number theory. Suppose p is a prime number satisfying p = 1 mod 2d, and let a be a primitive 2dth root of unity modulo p. Then, x d + 1 factors completely into linear polynomials modulo p-in particular,
where a i = a 2i−1 mod p. In some sense, the converse of the preceding statement is also true, and this is the essence of reciprocity-namely, in the ring R = Z[ x] /(x d + 1), the prime integer p is not actually prime, but rather it splits completely into prime ideals in R, that is, − a i ) , namely, the set of all R-elements that can be expressed as r 1 ·p+r 2 ·(x−a i ) for some r 1 , r 2 ∈ R. Each ideal p i has norm p, that is, roughly speaking, a 1/p fraction of R-elements are in p i , or, more formally, the p cosets 0+p i , . . . , (p−1)+p i partition R. The latter implies that R p i := R/p i R is isomorphic to Z p . The ideals R p i are relatively prime, and so they behave like relatively prime integers. In particular, the Chinese Remainder Theorem applies
For any x ∈ R, we will use [ x] p i to indicate that value k ∈ {0, . . . , p} for which x ∈ k + p i .
Although the prime ideals {p i } are relatively prime, they are close siblings, and it is easy, in some sense, to switch from one to another. One fact that we will use (when we finally apply batching to bootstrapping) is that, for any i, j, there is an automorphism σ i→j over R that maps elements of p i to elements of p j . Specifically, σ i→j works by mapping an R-element r = r(x)
, where e ij is some number relative prime to 2d. Notice that this automorphism just permutes the coefficients of r and fixes the free coefficient. Notationally, we will use σ i→j (v) to refer to the vector that results from applying σ i→j coefficient-wise to v. Note that σ i→j (·) permutes the elements of its input vector and possibly flips the sign for some of them.
How Batching Works.
We will show that the following holds. PROOF. Deploying batching inside our scheme FHE is quite straightforward. First, we pick a prime p = 1 mod 2d of size polynomial in the security parameter. (One should exist under the GRH.)
The next step is simply to recognize that our scheme FHE works just fine when we replace the original plaintext space R 2 with R p . There is nothing especially magical about the number 2. In the basic scheme E described in Section 4.1, E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk) is modified in the obvious way so that A · s = p · e, rather than 2 · e. (This modification induces a similar modification in SwitchKeyGen.) Decryption becomes m =[ [ c, s ] q ] p . Homomorphic operations use mod-p gates rather than boolean gates, and it is easy (if desired) to emulate boolean gates with mod-p gates (e.g., we can compute XOR(a, b) for a, b ∈ {0, 1} 2 using mod-p gates for any p as a + b − 2ab). For modulus switching, we use Scale(c 1 , q j , q j−1 , p) rather than Scale(c 1 , q j , q j−1 , 2). The larger rounding error from this new scaling procedure increases the noise slightly, but this additive noise is still polynomial in the security parameter and the number of levels, and thus is still consistent with our setting of parameters. In short, FHE can easily be adapted to work with a plaintext space R p for p of polynomial size.
The final step is simply to recognize that, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, evaluating an arithmetic circuit over R p on input x ∈ R n p implicitly evaluates, for each i, the same arithmetic circuit over R p i on input x projected down to R n p i . The evaluations modulo the various prime ideals do not "mix" or interact with each other.
Bootstrapping as an Optimization
Bootstrapping is no longer strictly necessary to achieve leveled FHE. However, in some settings, it may have some advantages.
-Performance. The per-gate computation is independent of the depth of the circuit being evaluated. -Flexibility. Assuming circular security, a bootstrapped scheme can perform homomorphic evaluations indefinitely without needing to specify in advance, during Setup, a bound on the number of circuit levels. -Memory. Bootstrapping permits short ciphertexts (e.g., encrypted using AES other space-efficient cryptosystem) to be decompressed to longer ciphertexts that permit homomorphic operations. Bootstrapping thus allows us to save memory by storing data encrypted in the compressed form, while retaining the ability to perform homomorphic operations.
Here, we revisit bootstrapping, viewing it as an optimization rather than a necessity. We also reconsider the scheme FHE that we described in Section 4, viewing the scheme not as an end in itself, but rather as a very powerful SWHE whose performance degrades polynomially in the depth of the circuit being evaluated, as opposed to previous SWHE schemes whose performance degrades polynomially in the degree. In particular, we analyze how efficiently it can evaluate its decryption function as needed to bootstrap. Not surprisingly, our faster SWHE scheme can also bootstrap faster. The decryption function has only logarithmic depth and can be evaluated homomorphically in time quasiquadratic in the security parameter (for the RLWE instantiation), giving a bootstrapped scheme with quasiquadratic per-gate computation overall.
To apply the Bootstrapping Theorem, we need to bound the circuit complexity of the decryption of our scheme. We start by recalling that the decryption function is m =[ [ c, s ] q ] 2 . Suppose that we are given the bits (elements in R 2 ) of s as input, and we want to compute [ [ c, s ] q ] 2 using an arithmetic circuit that has Add and Mult gates over R 2 . (When we bootstrap, of course we are given the bits of s in encrypted form.) Note that we will run the decryption function homomorphically on level-0 ciphertexts, that is, when q is small, only polynomial in the security parameter. What is the complexity of this circuit? Most importantly for our purposes, what is its depth and size? The answer is that we can perform decryption withÕ(λ) computation and O(log λ) depth. Thus, in the RLWE instantiation, we can evaluate the decryption function homomorphically using our new scheme with quasiquadratic computation. (For the LWE instantiation, the bootstrapping computation is quasiquadratic.) 
PROOF. Obviously, each product c[ i] ·s[ i]
can be written as the sum of at most log q shifts of s [ i] . These horizontal shifts of s[ i] use at most 2 log q columns. Thus, c, s can be written as the sum of n·log q numbers, where each number has 2 log q digits. As discussed in Gentry [2009b] , we can use the three-for-two trick, which takes as input three numbers in binary (of arbitrary length) and outputs (using constant depth) two binary numbers with the same sum. Thus, with O(log(n · log q)) = O(log n + log log q) depth and O(n log 2 q) computation, we obtain two numbers with the desired sum, each having O(log n + log q) bits. We can sum the final two numbers with O(log log n + log log q) depth and O(log n + log q) computation. So far, we have used depth O(log n + log log q) and O(n log 2 q) computation to compute c, s . Reducing this value modulo q is an operation akin to division for which there are circuits of size polylog(q) and depth log log q. Finally, reducing modulo 2 just involves dropping the most significant bits. Overall, since we are interested only in the case where log q = O(log λ), we have that decryption requiresÕ(λ) computation and depth O(log λ).
The preceding lemma generalizes to GLWE as follows. PROOF. The proof is practically identical to Lemma 6.2, except we use DFT to multiply elements in R instead of "standard" integer multiplication. Since all roots of x d +1 are 2dth roots of unity, we can use FFT to achieve multiplication in logarithmic depth and quasilinear size (in d log q).
The procedure thus proceeds exactly as in Lemma 6.2, except the last operations of taking modulo q and then modulo 2 are preformed d times, but since these only require log(q) depth and polylog(q) size, the bound still holds.
We can now apply the Bootstrapping Theorem to our scheme from Section 4. The relevant values of n, d, q when applying Lemma 6.3 are those of the last level (level L) of the scheme, since these are the values that are actually being decrypted. While modulus reduction guarantees that the values of q L , n L are independent of L, it is normally the case that d L depends on L (think, e.g., about the case of n = 1). It may seem therefore that the decryption depth depends on L contrary to the compactness requirement. Using the techniques of Section 3, we can convert d L back down to d 0 , which is independent of L. (We remark, however, that even if we don't make the conversion, the dependence on L is small enough that our scheme is bootstrappable.)
Putting the pieces together, we get the following. PROOF. The theorem is a straightforward derivation from combining the bootstrapping theorem , Lemma 6.3, and Theorem 5.6.
Batching the Bootstrapping Operation
Suppose that we are evaluating a circuit homomorphically, that we are currently at a level in the circuit that has at least d gates (where d is the dimension of our ring), and that we want to bootstrap (refresh) all of the ciphertexts corresponding to the respective wires at that level. That is, we want to homomorphically evaluate the decryption function at least d times in parallel. This seems like an ideal place to apply batching.
However, there are some nontrivial problems. In Section 6.1, our focus was rather limited. For example, we did not consider whether homomorphic operations could continue after the batched computation. Indeed, at first glance, it would appear that homomorphic operations cannot continue, since, after batching, the encrypted data is partitioned into non-interacting, relatively-prime plaintext slots, whereas the whole point of homomorphic encryption is that the encrypted data can interact (within a common plaintext slot). Similarly, we did not consider homomorphic operations before the batched computation. Somehow, we need the input to the batched computation to come pre-partitioned into the different plaintext slots.
What we need are Pack and Unpack functions that allow the batching procedure to interface with normal homomorphic operations. One may think of the Pack and Unpack functions as an on-ramp to and an exit-ramp from the "fast lane" of batching. Let us say that normal homomorphic operations will always use the plaintext slot R p Here, we describe suitable Pack and Unpack functions. These functions will make heavy use of the automorphisms σ i→j over R that map elements of p i to elements of p j . (See Section 6.1.1.) We note that Smart and Vercauteren [2011] used these automorphisms to construct something similar to our Pack function (though for unpacking they resorted to bootstrapping). We also note that Lyubashevsky et al. [2010] used these automorphisms to permute the ideal factors q i of the modulus q, which was an essential tool toward their proof of the pseudorandomness of RLWE.
Toward Pack and Unpack procedures, we begin with the observation that if m is encoded as a number in {0, . . . (c) , σ i→j (s) ] q ] p j . That is, we can switch the plaintext slot but leave the decrypted message unchanged by applying the same automorphism to the ciphertext and the secret key. (These facts follow from the fact that σ i→j is a homomorphism, that it maps elements of p i to elements of p j , and that it fixes integers.) Of course, then we have a problem: the ciphertext is now under a different key, whereas we may want the ciphertext to be under the same key as other ciphertexts. To get the ciphertexts to be back under the same key, we simply use the SwitchKey algorithm to switch all of the ciphertexts to a new common key.
Some technical remarks before we describe Pack / Unpack more formally: We mention again that E.PublicKeyGen is modified in the obvious way so that A · s = p · e rather than 2 · e, and that this modification induces a similar modification in SwitchKeyGen. Also, let u ∈ R be a short element such that u ∈ 1 + p 1 and u ∈ p j for all j = 1. It is obvious that such a u with coefficients in (−p/2, p/2] can be computed efficiently by first picking any element u such that u ∈ 1 + p 1 and u ∈ p j for all j = 1, and then reducing the coefficients of u modulo p. The properties of the resulting scheme are summarized in the following theorem, which is only stated for the RLWE setting (since batched bootstrapping only works in the ring setting). PROOF. Consider an evaluation of depth t circuit, and let w 1 , . . . , w t be the width of each of the levels of the circuit. Then, let w = (1/t) · i∈ [t] w i be the average width of the circuit and by the theorem statement w = (λ). The total number of gates is (naturally) t · w.
The evaluation of level i of the circuit involves a bootstrapping operation of the 2 · w i input wires into the gates, in addition to w i gate evaluations.
We pack the 2 · w i standalone ciphertexts into 2w i /d ≤ 2w i /d + 1 packed ciphertexts, where d = (λ) is the parameter of the ring that also determines the number of ciphertexts that can be packed. The cost of this packing/unpacking is linear in the input length which is 2w i ·Õ(λ).
For each packed ciphertext, we perform bootstrapping which involves a homomorphic evaluation of the decryption circuit. The total cost per packed ciphertext is thusÕ(λ 2 ). The total complexity for all packed ciphertexts is therefore at most (2w i /d + 1) ·Õ(λ 2 ).
Finally, the evaluation of the w i actual gates has (total) complexity w i ·Õ(λ).
Summing all of this, we get that the total complexity of evaluating level i of the circuit is Summing over all t levels, we get that the total complexity of evaluating the entire circuit is at most (t · w + t · λ + t · wλ/d) ·Õ(λ) , and the per-gate cost is obtained by dividing by t · w, and recalling that w, d = (λ):
(1 + λ/w + λ/d) ·Õ(λ) =Õ(λ) .
The theorem thus follows.
